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OF
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Defendants.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

REBECCA B. LARRABEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
GLENWOOD B. LARRABEE,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
ROYAL DAIRY PRODUCTS COMPANY,
MARY DOROTHY POULSEN, MARGARET
IONA AITKEN, GERALDINE L.
HOGAN, CORNELIA L. HANCOCK,
OTTO BLAINE LARRABEE , JR. , AND
WARREN H. LARRABEE ,

Case

No. 16589

Defendants.

DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff seeks to have an agreement reciting and defining
Defendant-Respondent's interest in real property declared a nullity

and revoked by the revocation of a revocable trust.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court found that the agreement was valid and bind-

ing on all of the parties; that it was independent of the revocable
trust; and that it was not revoked.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent seeks affirmation of the judgment

,
0

the trial judge.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Respondent agrees with the facts as set forth t.
Plaintiff, except where Plaintiff characterizes herself as the
owner of the property in question (because Defendant-Respondent
claims an interest therein), but feels that the facts, as recit
by Plaintiff, are incomplete.
Plaintiff and the Defendant-Respondent Glenwood Larrabee
entered into an agreement dated September 7, 1973 (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 4) which Defendant-Respondent will hereafter refer to
simply as 'the Agreement.

11

Thereafter Plaintiff made a revocable

trust agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1) which will be referred
to herein as "the Revocable Trust.

11

The Agreement provided for

a revocable trust as a means of husbanding the property in ques·
tion during Plaintiff's lifetime.

The Agreement was the culmin'

tion of a 2-year negotiation with Robert Ryberg representing
Plaintiff and all of Plaintiff's children, except Glenwood Larr:,
bee and Gerald E. Nielson representing Glenwood Larrabee.

In

1978 Plaintiff brought suit against Glenwood and the other chiii
ren as defendants.

The other children, being in reality co-

Plaintiffs, did not answer.

The complaint alleges the Agreemen:

was obtained by undue influence and was without consideration a:
asks that it be declared to be of no effect and cancelled (See
prayer, R-3).

Defendant-Respondent prepared to defend an undue
. I

influence-no consideration case.

-2-

When Plaintiff came to tria_,
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she abandoned both of those claims.

She then, with the concurrence

of Defendant-Respondent, placed in evidence the Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) and the Revocable Trust (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1),
together with two (2) notices from Plaintiff to Defendant-Respondent regarding the revocation of the Revocable Trust (Plaintiff's
Exhibits 2 and 3).
introduced.

No other evidence, testimony or written, was

Plaintiff then argued that the revocation of the Rev-

ocable Trust had the effect of revoking the Agreement and rested.
Defendant-Respondent moved for judgment at the conclusion of Plaintiff's case and the Court granted judgment for Defendant-Respondent.
Plaintiff has raised a question as to whether the Trust was
ever effectuated (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).

If it was, Defendant-

Respondent agrees that Plaintiff could and did revoke it.

If it

was not effectuated, as Plaintiff's attorney claims it was not,
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) it could not have been revoked and there
could have been no revocation of the principal Agreement.
The issue for this appeal is simply, given the four (4)
exhibits, without more, could reasonable men have concluded other
than that the revocation of the Trust revoked the principal Agree-

r:,

ment of the parties or, conversely, could the Court reasonably
conclude that the revocation of the Trust did not revoke the principal Agreement?
Note even if the Court agreed with Plaintiff as to all of
that, it does not follow that Defendant-Respondent does not have
an interest in the property.
such interest.

The evidence is that he does have

(The second recitation of the Agreement recites

that Defendant-Respondent had such interest in the property as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a result of his placing substantial improvements th
to an understanding that he would have the value
in excess of $57,000.00.)

o

ereon PUrsu2·

f th

e propert

If the agreement could be revoked,

interest did not J'ust disappear.

t:

The purpose of th e Agreement ,

to define and describe that interest.
Defendant-Respondent wishes to describe to the Court the: ..
cumstances of the making and execution of the Agreement (Plaint./
Exhibit 4) •

There was no evidence on that point, but the tria:

court was advised as to those circumstances in Defendant-Respc~·
dent's opening statement (R 101-105).

Since there was not evi-

dence, such description or explanation can only be considered,,
one explanation the trial court might have considered in its de·
termination that the revocation of the Revocable Trust did not :c
voke the principal Agreement.
Those facts are that Defendant-Respondent worked with his
father in a milk distributing and later an ice cream store and
restaurant business upon the property in question until his fat: !
0

died in 1952.

Pursuant to a family council with the late Emmet:

Brown, attorney, the family and particularly Plain tiff agreed::
Defendant-Respondent would take charge of the property; pay

PlJ

tiff rent for it; have the increase in value of the property th:
occurred after that time; and that the residual interest wouM~
I

divided equally among all of the children.

(The father had in·'

tended and willed that the property be divided only among the t:I
An appraisal was obtained indicating the value at that time was!

$57,000.00.
In 1971 there was complaint that t h e ren t was

-4-
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in arrears ,.

the demand was made for a return of the property.

Plaintiff and

the children other than Defendant-Respondent, by and through their
attorney Robert Ryberg, entered into extensive negotiations with
Defendant-Respondent, by and through his attorney Gerald E. Nielson, which resulted in the execution of the principal Agreement
almost two (2) years later.
:1

t,

:C.1

It was signed by the mother (Plain-

tiff-Appellant) , the Defendant-Respondent and all of the other
children.

It recited Defendant-Respondent's interest in the value

of the property because of his improvements on it, pursuant to a
prior understanding with the family; it provided for the surrender
by

Defendant-Respondent of the possession of the property;

it pro-

vided for the repayment by Defendant-Respondent of the past due
rents and other debts; it provided (and this is not immediately
apparent from a casual reading of the Agreement) for the benefit
and income from the property, including Defendant-Respondent's improvements on said property, to go to Plaintiff for a minimum of
five (5) years or until Plaintiff's death whichever was later
(Plaintiff was 82 or 83 at the time and the minimum of five years
of benefits was a bargained-for consideration intended to compensate for a prior disparity of the value of the property and the
rents which it received); it provided for the distribution of the
property upon Plaintiff's death or after the five years to all of
her children, after preserving Defendant-Respondent's agreed interest in it;

it made it clear that Plaintiff could consume the

property in her lifetime for her own support, but that she could
not alter the agreed-upon distribution and that she could not prefer one or more of the children over the others;

it provided a
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right of first refusal in Defendant-Respondent

to obtain the

erty upon the death of Plaintiff or a proposed sale;

t·

.

itpro.I
Vt.,

for mutual releases, indemnification for debts incurred by De:,

dant-Respondent and payment by Defendant-Respondent of increas,,

inheritance taxes caused by the improvements attributable to C,
fendant-Respondent.

It also provided for a revocable trust as

scheme to manage the property during Plaintiff's lifetime. Th:

Revocable Trust was signed approximately two (2) months after:

Agreement and recites that the distribution per said Trust sha:.
be modified in accordance with the provisions of the principal
Agreement.
Prior to the onset of this lawsuit, Plaintiff gave notice
her revocation of the Trust (clouded by an assertion that the
Trust was never effectuated)

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2).

She the;

attempted to sell the property without Defendant-Respondent's;
ticipation.

Defendant-Respondent recorded a Notice of Interest

the property by reason of the Agreement and Plaintiff brought:
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT HAD AN INTEREST IN THE PROP·
ERTY PURSUANT TO HIS PRIOR UNDERSTANDING WITH THE FAMILY
AND HIS IMPROVEMENTS MADE ON THE PROPERTY OVER A PERIOD
OF TWENTY (20) YEARS.
THAT INTEREST AND UNDERSTANDING
WAS MEMORIAL! ZED AND DEFINED BY THE AGREEMENT IN QUES·
TION.
IT WAS NOT REVOCABLE.
The Agreement, the Revocable Trust and the two (2) notic'
of revocation of the Trust constitute all of the evidence int
case.

Defendant-Respondent proposes to file copies of the

A'

ment and the Revocable Trust with his brief so that the Court
have them before it when it considers such briefs on this case
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Accordingly, Defendant-Respondent will resist extensive quotation
from those agreements.
The essence of Plaintiff's claim is that because the first
paragraph of the Agreement provided for the establishment of a
Revocable 'Trust, the balance of the Agreement provided only for
the definition of the terms of such Revocable Trust, all of which
was to be revocable at the whim of Plaintiff.
burden of proof at trial.

Plaintiff had the

Her position has to be that a bare read-

ing of the Agreement and Trust Agreement compels the result she
claims.

Since Plaintiff is the Appellant herein, her position must

further be that reasonable men could not disagree, except that such
reading compels that result.
Defendant-Respondent contends the opposite;

that a reading

of the documents compels the decision reached by the trial court.

If the situation were reversed, Defendant-Respondent would claim
that reasonable men could not find otherwise.
It is entirely consistent to provide for a revocable trust
as a management device to husband the property and at the same
time to memorialize and define Defendant-Respondent's interest in
the property.
It would be inconsistent to recite and define

Defendant-

Respondent 's interest in the property only to provide that such
interest is revocable at the whim of Plaintiff.

Plaintiff is

essentially asking the Court to conclude that the trial court
could not conclude other than that Defendant-Respondent made a
contract that not only gave Plaintiff the right to declare such
contract a nullity, but more importantly, that it gave Plaintiff
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the right to declare Defendant-Respondent's prior

conceded in::

est in the property a nullity.
There is no provision in the Agreement or in the Revocat
Trust that constitutes a grant of Defendant-Respondent• s interc
in the property (acquired by his improvements and the prior unco
standing) to Plaintiff or to the Trust

in a way that would ca.

such interest to revert to Plaintiff upon the revocation of the
Trust, as urged by Plaintiff.
Defendant-Respondent's right to purchase and his right

o:

first refusal are inconsistent with and unnecessary if Plainti:could simply annul the contract at her whim, as urged by Plaint:
Most importantly, the limitation of Plaintiff's right to
or dispose of the real property un ti 1 she consumes the rest of·.
property and the limitation of her right to prefer one of her c:
dren over the others is inconsistent with and unnecessary and r:.
ingless if Plaintiff was empowered to annul those limitations c:
her authority at her whim, as urged by Plaintiff.
The specific Agreement that Plaintiff is entitled to use 0
consume all of the property, including this property, upon cer'.c
I

conditions is meaningless if the construction of the Agreement
urged by Plaintiff is accepted.
The fact that the Agreement and the Revocable Trust were"
signed contemporaneously is significant.

(The Agreement is dat:

the 7th day of September, 1973 and the Revocable Trust is datec
the 7th day of November, 1973.)

If the parties intended ~~

Plaintiff could annul the Agreement at her whim, it would ~w
·
most i,,::
been necessary to protect that essential,overwhelming,
·
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tant of all rights by having the Revocable Trust executed contemporaneously with the Agreement.
That there are two (2) Agreements signed at different times
by different parties, belies the construction advanced by Plaintiff.

The provision for revocation of the Revocable Trust did not

say that the revocation of the Trust would have the effect of revoking the Agreement.

On the contrary, the Revocable Trust is

by its terms subject to the Agreement, but not vice versa.

If

the parties had intended the construction urged by Plaintiff, the
convenient thing would have been simply to say in the Agreement
that it was subject to the revocation provisions in the Revocable
Trust, or even more logically to dispense with the Agreement altogether and simply include the entire agreement of the parties in
the Trust Agreement.

But the parties made two (2) agreements.

Defendant-Respondent urges: that the first was intended to define
and describe Defendant-Respondent's interest in the property and
Plaintiff's rights and responsibilities respecting the same; and
that the second was intended to provide a means of caring for the
property in Plaintiff's name.

It was entirely logical to make the

second Agreement (the Revocable Trust) revocable, but it would
have made no sense at all to make the first one (the Agreement)
revocable.

Again, if the first one was intended to be revocable,

it would have been easy to say so.

While there is a signature of

Defendant-Respondent on the Revocable Trust, it was an acceptance
of the role as trustee.

It stretches the imagination to say that

by signing that acceptance to act as trustee, he was also agreeing
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that the revocation of the Trust Agreement would nullify or o::
wise modify his interest in the property; yet
what Plaintiff asks us to do.

'

that is e

xactly

On the other hand, if the cons::

tion advanced by Defendant-Respondent is correct, the requirerr:
for two (2) contracts is obvious.

The Revocable Trust is very

different than the principal Agreement and it would have been
inappropriate or at best very awkward to try to incorporate bot
agreements into one document.
The Revocable Trust itself provides that upon its termin::

the distribution shall be in equal shares, except as modified i:'
accordance with the provisions of the principal Agreement (pm·
graph 2 (e)) .

Plain tiff's Exhibit 2 is a letter from Plain tiff's attor:.::
to Defendant-Respondent.

It says:

Dear Mr. Larrabee:
This is to advise you, as one of the attorneys
for your mother, that your mother has elected to revoke the Trust Agreement dated November 7, 1973 in
which she is the Truster. This Trust, in my opinion,
has never legally been put into effect by the recording
of deeds, the setting up of trust accounts, or the like,
but should it have had any validity, she has the right
under Article 8 (VIII) to revoke the same.
Defendant-Respondent points out that if there is no Trust,
as urged by Plaintiff's attorney, there is no revocation, andi'
there is no revocation, it is impossible to conclude there was
a revocation of the principal Agreement.
This writer finds it difficult to argue this matter with·
out reciting his own testimony that Plaintiff's construction of
the Agreement is not what the parties intended or that the inte
pretation of Defendant-Respondent and the trial court
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-10-

·
15

obvic'-

~

what the parties did intend.

Acknowledging the defectiveness of

that form of argument, Defendant-Respondent points out that the
trial court also felt strongly about the matter.

see R 116,

lines 5 through 12 wherein the following dialogue between the
trial court and counsel for Plaintiff is recorded:
THE COURT: She has a right
she wants to with property having
trust, subject to Glen's interest
under that agreement of September

to do anything
revoked the
in the property
'73.

MR. HASLAM: If that is the way you interpret it, I suppose that is the way you interpret
it.
THE COURT: To me, it is so clear. I am surprised you argue it otherwise.
If there is a justification for Plaintiff's argument, and
Defendant-Respondent does not concede there is, it appears to be
that the provision for the creation of the Revocable Trust occurs
in the first paragraph of the Agreement, thus allowing the inference that all subsequent paragraphs are in reality sub-paragraphs.
But the paragraphs in the Agreement are numbered separately.

Para-

graphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are each as independent as paragraph 1.
The trial court so found.

In its Findings and Conclusions, it re-

cited: (R 84 and 85)
Findings of Fact 4. The Agreement and the Revocable
Trust are separate documents, each of which is complete on its face; each of which involves different
parties; and each of which is separately executed.
The Revocable Trust was executed approximately two (2)
months after the Agreement. While the Revocable Trust
was referred to in the Agreement and the Agreement was
referred to and incorporated in the Revocable Trust,
there is no provision in either document that makes one
dependent on the other.
Conclusions of Law 3. The reference to and the incorSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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poration of the Agreement in the Revocable Trust
was intended by the parties to make it clear that
the dispositive provisions of the Revocable Trust
were affected and modified by the terms of the
Agreement.
The Agreement and the Revocable Trust
are each separate independent agreements, neither
of which is dependent upon the other. The revocation of the Revocable Trust did not affect or revoke the Agreement.

Plaintiff has urged at the top of page 5 of her brief t~
rule that the effect to be given a contract depends on

~e~

of the parties and that this is to be ascertained by looking:

the entire contract and all of its parts in their relationshi:
to each other.

Defendant-Respondent concurs and urges thats·

dard in the analysis of the Agreement here under consideratic:
Defendant-Respondent has not cited any legal authority
the presentation of this argument.

It would be possible toe

cases relating to the Plaintiff's burden of proof at trialu
more importantly, to the Appellant's burden on appeal.

This

writer does not believe he can gainsay the Court's understand
of those rules and will resist that compulsion.

In the end,

case involves the interpretation of the Agreement and the Re'.
cable Trust.

They and the two (2) notices relating to revoci

were the only evidence before the trial court.

That the det1

mination of the intent of the parties as ascertained by look:
at the entire contract is the task at hand is asserted by pJ,
tiff and agreed to by Defendant-Respondent.
is entirely factual is itself significant.

That the dispu
Everyone knows

t

facts have to be determined by the trier of fact, and his de
~ination

should stand unless clearly erroneous.

-12-
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CONCLUSION
The trial court found that the Agreement was valid and binding on the parties;

that the Agreement and the Revocable Trust

are separate independent Agreements; and that the revocation of
the Trust did not revoke the Agreement.
strongly about that conclusion.

The trial judge felt

He was right.

Respectfully submitted,

'

~(~l/{_,,~~
GERALD E. NIELSON
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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TRUST AGHEEMENT

THfS THUST ACHEEI\l!ENT, made and enten:d into as of this

~day of

I

I

(

l.1 \ '-' - •

(,.

~

19__.lJ_, by and bdween REBECCA B.

-;

LAHRABEE, hereinafter called the

11

Trustor,

11

and OTTO BLAINE LARRABEE,

JR., GLENWOOD B. LARRABEE am! WARREN H. LARHABEE, herinafter

referred to jointly as "Trustee.

11

WITN ESSETH:
WHEREAS, the Trustor has assigned, transferred, conveyed and
delivered or is about to assign, transfer, convey and deliver to the Trustee
cPrtain property set forth and more particularly described in Exhibit "A", attached
hereto and made a part hereof for the purposes hereinafter set forth.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises and cove-

nants herein contained the parties agree:
ARTICLE I
Trust Estate
Trustor or any other person may make additional contributions
of property to Trustee, in trust, by inter vivos or testamentary transfer and

Trustee may in its discretion accept such property, in trust.

The property

described in ExhilJit "A 11 attached hereto, together with all other property that
may be contributed to and accepted by Trustee, in trust, and together with all
increments to, income from, and gain from the sale of or exchange of all property
held by Trustee, in trust, and together with all other property coming into
possession of Trustee by virtue of the sale, exchange, investment, reinvestmcnt or disposition or use of property held by the Trustee, in trust, shall
constitute the trust estate and shall be held, invested, reim·ested, managed and
distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Trust Agreement.
ARTICLE II

Dispositive Provisions
Trustee shall distribute the income and principal of the trust as
follows:
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1.

f>uri11" tl1r~ Life of Tn1st"r.

(a)
1,"·

Bc:ndits for Tr11stor.

Tile T!'ustee shall pay to the Trustur

iJu berwfi I s11ch arr1011nts from the [H'incipal or income of the trust es late as

,r1e shall from time to time in writing direct.

If Trustor becomes legally incom-

petent or otherwise unable to handle her affairs, Trustee shall pay to or for the
benefit of Trustor, so much of the income and principal of the Trust Estate as
Trustt>c in it.s discretion deems reasonably necessary or appropriate for the
proper ma intc· na nee, care and support of Trustor.

2.

At the Death of Trustor.
(a) Death.Taxes, Costs, and Expenses.

Trustee shall use so

much of the income and principal of the trust as is necessary to pay the expenses
of the last illness, funeral and burial of Trustor, all taxes that may arise because
of Trustor's death, and all other just claims against Trustor's estate.
(b)

of Trustor·

01·

Terminatio11.

The: Trust shall terminate upon the death

on the first clay of September, 1976, whichever last occurs; or

when the Trust estate shall have been completely consumed in accordance with

the provisions of this Trust Agreement.
(c)

Distribution Upon Termination.

Upon the termination of

the Trust, Trustee shall distribute the residue of the Trust estate to MARY

DOROTHY POULSEN, MARGAHET IO'\E AITKEN, GERALDI~E L. HOGAN,
CORNELIA L. !IAN COCK, OTTO BLAINE LARRABEE, .TR., GLENWOOD B.
LARH!\BEE; and WAR KEN H. LARHABEE, or if any of said persons are deceased

to tho s•irviviiig issue> of them by right of representation, in equal shares proviued that said equal shai·cs shall be modified in accordance \1ith the provisions

of an Agreeme11t between the Trustor and her children dated the - - - day of
19 _ _.

(A copy of which agreement is attached to this Trust

Ai.;reement and hy rcft•rence is incorporated herein.)

ARTICLE III
Powers of Trustee
In the administration of the trus t •

Trustee shall have the following

powers:
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1.
pili,tlion \"hid1

To huld as part of the trust estate all of the stock in any cor-

r11;1y cnttt<: illto his hands.

If the shares of stock in any corp(Jcation

1,.:ld [,y Tn1s1ce slu.11 he a majority of its total outstanding \Oting stock, Trustee

n:iy use such stock control to continue the corporation's business for such time

1

~nd in such rnallncr as Trustee may deern advisable.

In Trustee's discretion,

thr kind of l>usincss in which the corporation is engaged may he changed and the

"cope and natur·e of its activities enlarged or diminished, or it may be dissolved
and its assets liquidated.
n~ss

Trustee shall have, respecting the corporation's busi-

and its stock owned by Trustee, all the powers of a natural person.

Trustee

is authorized, but not required to vote stock held by Trustee in such a way as to

elect Trustee as a member of the Board of Directors of the corpora tic,11.

In the

absence of actual notice to the contrary, Trustee may accept as correct, financial
and other statements rendered by such corporations from time to time as to their

conclilion and operations.

The corporation shall be regarded as an entity separate

from the trust.

2.

To hold any property received at the inception of the trust or

subsequently added to it or acquired by it pursuant to proper authority as long as
Trustee, in the exercise of reason;ible prudt.:nce, discretion and intelligence,
may deem retention to be in the best interests of the trust estate.
3.

To manage, control, sell, convey, exchange, partition, divide,

suhdivide, improve, repair; to grant options and sell on deferred payments
pr·operty, real or personal in the trust estate; to lease for terms within or extending beyond the dur-ation of the trust for any purpose, including exploration for

and rernoval of gas, oil and other minerals; and to create restrictions, easements,
and other servitudes.

4.

To compromise, arbitrate, or otherwise adjust claims in favor

of en· against the trust.

ti.
, , ' nlit

To invest funds of the trust estate in such properties, whether

dtt\ltnri:cecl by the law for

tlie 1· n"estment
of trust funds,
•

as

men of prudence,

discTetion and intelligence purchase for their own account, having regard not to
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'i";cuL11iOJ• but tu tlw perm:i.nent disriusitir~ri of lheic fu!lds

diicl

considering the

pt"l,tlilc incrnne as well as tile prob;ible safety of their capital; including but not
IJ.·· i·my

"r

11111Ll;:ilion, real property or i11terests therein, corporate bonds and

Jclwnturcs, slucks, pn·ferred or common, and participations in a common trust
fund.

6.

To borrow money for any trust puqiose upon such terms and

conditions as Trustee may deem proper, and to obligate the trust estate for
repayment; to encumber the trust estate or any of its property by mortgage,
deed of trust, pledge or otherwise.
7.

To have, respecting securities, all the rights, powers, and

privileges of an owner, including the power to give proxies, and to pay assessments and other sums deemed by Trustee to be necessary for the protection of
the trust estate; to participate in voting trust, pooling agreements, foreclosures,
l'eorganizations, consolidations, mergers, and liquidations, and in connection
therewith to deposit securities with and transfer title to any protective or other
committee under s11ch terms as Trustee may deem advisable; to exercise or sell
stock subscriptions or conversion rights; to accept and retain as an investment all
securities or· other property received through the exercise of any of the foregoing
powers.
8.

To determine what is principal and what is income of the trust

and to apportion and allocate in its discretion receipts and expenses as between
Pl'incipa 1 and income.
9.

To hold securities or other properties in the trust estate in

his name as Trustee hereunder or in his own name or in the name of his nominee,
and to hold such securities unregistered in such condition that ownership will
µass by delivery.
1 o.

T o carry insurance of such kinds and in such amounts as

r1·11sti'e rnay deem advisable at the expense of the trust; to insure against loss
IJ.1

s

0

fin: or other cause any of the property constituting a part of the trust estate,

· PZtrately or together with

any other trust estate hai.ing a common interest or
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"!illc;:tlioli, and to Jl3Y f"1· such in::;urance Otlt of the princiral or income of the

lll n·sto1·i11g ui· rqlai l'ing tl1e property constituting the trust estate, unli;s,, the
pul'puse of th<' trust wou1d be best served by making the proceeds of said insurance
a p;.irt of the pr·incip:il uf the trust, as determined by Trustee in its discretion.
11.

To commence or defend such litigation '"ith respect to the

trust or any rt·operty of the trust estatr> as Trustee may deem ad\·isable at the
e>.pense of the trust.
12.

To loan or advance Trustee's own funds to the trust for any

rurpose thereof at the then current rate of interest, and any such loan or ad,·a11ce,
together with interest, shall be a first lien against the trust estate and shall be
repaid therefrom.

Trustee is authorized to deal \1·ith any indebtedness, liability,

or obligation due to or from the trust and in connection therewith Trustee may
m:1k1' such extensions, compromises or other agreements relative thereto as
Trustee rn its discretion may approve.
13.

All taxes, asse;:;srnents, debts, and charges and other expenses

i11currPd by Trustee in the administrati0!1 or protection of the trust estate,
including compensation for Trustee or any other services, shall be a charge
upon the trust estate and shall be paid by Trustee out of principal or out of income, or partially out of each, in such manner and proportion as Trustee in its
absolute discretion, may determine to be advisable.
14.

To operate solely or in conjunction with others any business

or enteqirise, whether it be an individual business, general or limited partnership, or c:nqioratir,ns, for so long a tinie and in such manner as it deems proper
for the best ir1tcrcsts of the trust estate.
15.
1Taso 11 :rbly
c,

f

JI

11

To ernp1oy attorneys, accountants, agents, and brokers

c;cessary in the administration of the trust arid to engage the services

.
t .
d reprcsentati,·es as may be necessary
e1r1ployccs, super1ntendi;nts, agen s, an

app1 uprialc for conducting any business or enterprise.
16.

.
·
ents of income or principal to any
To distribute any paym

. .
who is not of full legal capacity, by making
minor beneficiary, or any bene f 1c1ary
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:ui.' sucil Jisl r·lln1li,>11 Jircclly to such beneficiary, or by arplying the distribution

for the b"11C'fit of such beneficiary, or by depositing cash distribution into a
,;·,,ings :tcCtJ1111t of any neputable bank in the name of the beneficiary, and all
di~tributions

so made or applied shall be distributions of the Trust estate and a

full discharge of Trustee.

17.

At the time of any partial or final distributions of the Trust

estate, to partition, allot and distribute the Trust estate in undi\·ided interests,
or in kind, or partly in money and partly in kind, at valuations determined by
the trustee, which determination shall be conclusive on all parties concerned
and to sell such property as the Trustee may deem necessa:-y to make division
or distribution.

18.

To reimburse Trustee from income or principal or both of

the Trust estate for any loss, liability or expense incurred by reason of Trustee's

holding any property received or held in trust.
Unless specifically limited, all discretions conferred upon Trustee
shall be absolute and their exercise conclusive on all persons interested in the
Trust estate.

The enumeration of certain powers of Trustee shall not limit the

general powers, Trustee being vested with and having all the rights, powers,
privileges and immunities which an absolute owner of the same property would
have in order to further the trust purposes.
ARTICLE IV
Compensation of Trustee
The Trustee, other than a corporate trustee, as hereinafter provi ded, shall not be entitled to receive compensation prove de cl that the indi viduab
acting as trustee will be entitled to reasonable compensation on an hourly basis
together with reasonable mileage for services which they render in their individual capacities to the trustee.
r)ia· 11

''

'J'·

l

>e entitled to receive sue

u1stit11tio11s

3

If a corporate trustee is appointed, such trustee

l amounts as are currently charged by persons
1

· ·1
t
t of Salt Lake City, Utah.
cting as trustees of s1n11 ar rus s
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AHl'ICLE V
Successor Trustee
If tl1c Tr·uslee herein named resigns as Tru;;tee or is otherwise

unaLlc or unwilling to or fails to sccvc as Trustee, Trustor he;reby nominates
and appoints VALLEY BAN£<. & TRLST CO,\IPANY of Salt Lake City, Utah, as
successor truske and its successors and assigns are nominated and appointed
a~

suLsequent successor trustees.
If a single trustee resigns or is unwilling or fails to serve as

trustee, another trustee may be nominated who is a blood member of the REBECCA
LARHABEI·: family to serve in such trustee's place with the written concurrence

of the trustor.

If two trustees resign or are unwilling or fail to serve as trustees,

two other trustees may be nominated v.ho are blood members of the REBECCA
LARRABEE family to serve in such trustees' place, with the written concurrence
of the tr us tor.

ARTICLE VI
Majol'ity Contcol of Trust0cs
In the c\·ent all of the trustees do not agree on any action or
matter, a sirnµle majority will control.

Such majority will be entitled to do

a11ything or take any action the trustee can do or take as herein provided.
ARTICLE

vrr

Spendthrift Provision
No beneficiary under this Trust Agreement shall have the power
to pledge, assign, mortgage, sell or in any other· manner transfer or hypothecate
any interest which such be11eficiary may ha\·e or may expect to have in any

.
.
have any power in
income
or principal of the trust; nor sha 11 any b ene r·ic1ary
any manner to anticipate, charge, or encumber his or her interest either in
·
· t eres t of a ny beneficiary be liable or
rncorne
or in µrincipal; nor shall sue ll u1
.'-'ubjc!ct to in any manner while in the possession of Trustee for the debts, conILwt.c·,
11;1 lJL·1·t·
e ents , obligations or torts of such beneficiary.
- .,
1 ies, engag-'m
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ARTICLE

vrn

Powl't' of T1·u~>to1· to Arncnd or Revoke

Nutwithsbnding anything in this Trust Agreentent to the contra,-y,
Trustor will l1avcc tlte right at any time or times to amend any of the provisions
of thi:o Trust Agreement or to amend any amendment thereto by an instrument

in writing executed by Trustor and delin~red to Trustee; prodded, however, that
Trustor shall not have power to amend the Trust Agreement, in such a way as
to increase the duties of Trustee or to impose any additional burdens on him,
ll'lthout the consc:nt of Trustee.

Trustor shall have the right at any time or times

to revoke this Trust Agreement in whole or in part, by an instrument in writing
executed by Trustor and delivered to Trustee, upon paying all sums due to Trustee
and indemnifying Trustee against loss from liabilities lawfully incurred in the
administration of the trust.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Rebecca B. Larrabee, Trustor, and
Otto Blaine Larrabee, Jr., Glenwood B. Larrabee, and Warren H. Larrabee,
Trustees, have executed this Trust Agreement as of the day and year first above
written.

fl , ( J<--CC c < '-

{j

j

,,
Cl /) )

l'f_

(.;--cc

REBECCA B. LARRABEE

I

GLENWOOD B. LARRABEE

/~

t f/ti2~'4l

j

j_ .

/'

WARREN H. LARRABEE
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EXIIIBI'f

of the stack af Royal Dairy
rc:'il

"A"

a~d

af the fallowins described

pl'operty lFcreinafter refer:ced to as "the P1· .1perty

11
:

Lots 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, of Block
2, Dieter and Jo~nson, Main Street
Addition, as recorded in the Office
of the Salt L~ke County Recorder,
together \·1ith all i:.1pravements thereon.
more co111mo;1ly known as 1501 South Main Street, Salt Lake City,
Utah.
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